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Abstract. The backdrop to this research is the existence of dissatisfaction that has become pervasive among many local
governments, producers of oil and gas in Indonesia, towards unjust oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund (DBH) between central
and local governments. To that end, the main objective of this research is to formulate a Revenue Sharing Fund of oil and gas
production that is just for all parties by using a Rights-Based Approach (RBA). To provide the basis for the formula, the study
uses qualitative method and the data collection techniques are in-depth interviews, FGD, and document analysis (desk study). The
findings recommend two scenarios. The first scenario posits indigenous communities under two possibilities, i.e. either conferring
share ownership in oil and gas business or the right to lease land in areas where oil and gas production occurs. The second scenario
is to calculate oil and gas revenue sharing fund on the basis of governmental tier in a just and proportional manner, starting from
the provincial, district, sub-district, village, and kampong levels, particularly for native and indigenous communities who are
producers and non-producers of oil and gas.
Keywords: fiscal decentralization, rights-based approach , oil and gas revenue sharing fund
Abstrak. Studi ini dilatarbelakangi adanya ketidakpuasan banyak pemerintah daerah di Indonesia yang menjadi penghasil minyak
dan gas (migas) terhadap pembagian Dana Bagi Hasil (DBH) migas yang tidak adil antara pusat dan daerah. Berdasarkan
hal tersebut, tujuan utama dari kajian ini adalah untuk merumuskan formula DBH Migas yang adil bagi semua pihak dengan
menggunakan Pendekatan Berbasis Hak. Untuk merumuskan formula tersebut, penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dan
teknik pengumpulan datanya adalah wawancara mendalam, FGD dan pengumpulan data sekunder. Penelitian ini menghasilkan dua
scenario sebagai rekomendasi. Skenario pertama menempatkan penduduk asli atau masyarakat adat di bawah dua kemungkinan
yakni ikut menjadi pemilik saham bisnis migas atau hanya menyewakan tanah yang di dalamnya mengandung migas. Skenario
kedua adalah menghitung perolehan DBH sesuai level pemerintahan secara proporsional mulai dari tingkat provinsi, kabupaten,
distrik, kampung dan masyarakat adat baik yang menjadi penghasil maupun bukan penghasil migas.
Kata kunci: desentralisasi fiscal, dana bagi hasil migas, pendekatan berbasis hak

INTRODUCTION
Relations between central and local governments
have been characterized by ebbs and flow since
Indonesia proclaimed her Independence in 1945. On
several occasions some local governments resorted to
stage rebellions and demand secession as a response
to treatments the central government imposed to them
which they perceived as both unjust and impoverishing
for people in the regions. In early days after Indonesia
proclaimed her Independence, she had to contend
with the first rebellion occurring in East Sumatra and
Indonesia Communist Party in Madiun. Subsequently,
other rebellions followed in several areas, backed
by the support of Dutch government, by and large,
clamored for sovereignty. In fact, during the period
when Indonesia was under Parliamentary democratic
government, rebellions became so frequent that the
government had a lot of resources and effort to stifle
them. The list included Darul Islam/Indonesia Soldiers
of Islam (DI/TII) in West Java under the leadership
of Kartosuwiryo; in Eastern Indonesia, Maluku in
particular, Soumokil formed Republic Maluku Selatan
(RMS); while during mid-1950s, Indonesia had to

contend with the PRRI rebellion which had its epicenter
in West Sumatra as well as Permesta rebellion that had
its basis in North Sulawesi.
Some of the rebellions were motivated by the
disgruntlement over economic structure in Java
compared with the condition outside Java as well as
the over centralization of authority and power in the
central government (Amal, 1992; Pratikno, 2005; Haris,
2005; Anne Both, 2014). In the realm of economy, the
central government based in Jakarta in general and Java
in particular enjoyed most of the benefits generated by
the production of natural resources. The distribution of
benefits from government policies became even more
lopsided in favor of Java compared with Outer Java
areas. Such an outcome was a logical consequence of
a government system that was highly centralized in the
central government, leaving little authority and power
for local governments. Policy on unfair natural resource
revenue sharing between the central and the regions
is believed to cause the outbreak of some regional
rebellions in the early years of Indonesian independence.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the rebellions
were not confined to the old order era, but on the contrary
also characterized early phases of the reform era. This
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includes but by no means limited to the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) and Organization for the Liberation
of Papua (OPM). The two rebel movements happened
to be based in areas at the western most and eastern most
parts of Indonesian archipelago, respectively, and were
by and largely attributable to unfair share in the control
of petroleum oil and natural gas resources as well as
other key minerals which are vital sources of revenues
in the natural resources sector in Indonesia. The unjust
distribution of natural resources was reflected in the
formula used in the oil and gas revenue sharing fund
(Dana Bagi Hasil Migas) which does not take into
consideration let alone appreciate interests of local
communities who should be the principal owners of
such natural resources.
In light of the history of the relations between the
central and local government that is characterized by
unfairness in the sharing of natural resources profit,
to mitigate the potential for recurrence of episodes in
the center-local government relations by designing a
formula that is able to ensure appropriate and fair sharing
of mineral resources production for local governments
is deemed necessary and urgent. The designation of
the formula using only an economic approach is not
entirely pertinent as such a method does not take into
consideration the socio-culture of the local population
who bear the brunt of the adverse impact that emanates
from mining activities in their area. Formula for revenuesharing of oil and gas in Aceh and Papua are regulated by
Special Autonomy Laws to comply with the 70 percent
for the producing region and 30 percent for the center.
This composition already reflects fairness for producing
region, but unfortunately there is no transparency as
to the real numbers of oil and gas production that has
been taken from any oil and gas wells and the number of
profit obtained. Moreover, these benefits are not flowing
to the level of indigenous peoples, the actual original
owner of oil and gas. The budget coming from oil and
gas Revenue Sharing Funds is usually just stop at the
district whose allocations are often not transparent. The
community (grassroots) received the negative impact of
oil and gas exploitation due to a broken environment.
Ultimately it did not receive the benefits of the natural
resources that come from the village (CPPS-UGM,
2012). Social and political upheaval of indigenous
peoples against oil and gas companies in several regions
in Indonesia is the result of this injustice.
By contrast, in other regions that are also a producer
of oil and gas e.g. East Kalimantan (Kaltim) and Riau,
the formula of Revenue Sharing Funds is more heavy
into 70 percent for the center and 30 percent for the
regions. For example, the transfer of funds from the
natural resources of Kaltim province dries out quickly
as Kaltim only earned an average of IDR 7 trillion of the
total 100 trillion-120 trillion rupiahs transferred to the
center from East Kalimantan (Kurniawati, 2012). This
formula is getting lame if traced down; there is hardly
some budget of oil and gas Revenue sharing funds
flowing to the indigenous peoples and the oil-producing
villages. The field implementation fact of this policy is
very tragic, for the villages and communities have to
bear the burden of natural exploitation, i.e. the negative

17

impact of damaged environments, while each day
they only watch the natural resources from the village
exploited, without leaving any benefit for them. Thus
we can conclude that the current formula that has been
used in distributing natural resources Revenue Sharing
Fund in general and petroleum oil and natural gas in
particular, does not in any way take into consideration
the interests of local and indigenous communities.
Oil and gas is part and parcel of their indigenous
communities hence they have an obligation to protect
even if it means losing their lives in the process. In
fact what is also interesting is that they have gone to
the extent of mentioning the percentage of oil and gas
production they are supposed to receive, which is 12
percent. To that end, it is very relevant that this research
uses a Rights-Based Approach (RBA) in formulating oil
and gas Revenue Sharing Fund. This study uses RBA
because this model takes into account the existence of
the lowest levels of government and indigenous peoples
as rights holders who should also benefit from the results
of oil and gas mining in the village. Therefore, this paper
examines the perception of the community and village
government on oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund
formula that is considered fair. Their perception then
became the basis for developing a formula proposed
in this study. In the meantime, the choosing of oil and
gas sector was based on the important consideration that
natural resources is one of the vital sectors in Indonesia.
RBA can be understood as norms and entitlements
that create constraints and obligations in interactions
between people or institutions. The definition of rights
refers to human rights i.e. norms that help to protect
all people from severe political, legal, social, or other
abuses. It is based on the understanding that all people
are, by virtue of being human, inherently entitled to
minimum standards of freedom and dignity, regardless
of nationality, place of residence, gender, origin, color,
religion, language, or any other status. In Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right to
own property alone as well as in association with others.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property
(www.ohchr.org).
RBA concept is similar with the relationship between
duty bearers and rights holders. In the opinion of
Campese et al. (2009) all human beings are rights
holders. The individual and groups responsible for
upholding and enabling the realization of rights are duty
bearers. The State is a primary duty bearer, but other nonstate actors also have important responsibilities. Duty
bearer’s responsibilities are typically categorized as
respecting, protecting, and fulfilling rights. Respecting
rights means refraining from interfering with people’s
pursuit or enjoyment of their rights, for example through
uncompensated or forced eviction. Protecting rights
means ensuring that ‘third parties’ (including private
businesses and NGOs) do not interfere with people’s
pursuit or enjoyment of their rights. Fulfilling rights
mean creating an enabling environment for people to
rely on their rights. Rights must be directly provided
when people cannot provide them for themselves,
such as providing food aid following a severe drought
(Campese et al., 2009; Wahyuningsih, et.all., 2014).
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RBA possesses a strong correlation to the natural
resources management, especially on Oil and Gas. This
aspect is a sensitive issue, triggering complaints from
local stakeholders including local community as those
who suffer most as a result of abandoned ownership
due to the management of their own regional natural
resources. RBA has a correlation with the natural
resources management including the oil and gas Revenue
Sharing Fund; RBA helps the right holders to fulfill
their basic needs, especially in the fields of economic,
education, and health. This would create healthy
systems on the natural resources management and oil &
gas sharing fund. RBA also helps the government and
community to protect the environment, meaning also
to fulfill the rights of their future offspring. The right
fulfillment can be obtained by recognition on the land
and the customary rights. The failure in fulfilling RBA
in terms of oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund will result
in conflict increment that threatens the security of the
economy of the whole community.
The oil and gas sharing fund is part of fiscal
decentralization system. Litvack (1999) explained that
one of decentralization type is fiscal decentralization
i.e. the authority given to the locals to explore potential
income sources, and the right to accept transfer
from higher government and to determine routine
expenditure, as well as investment. Therefore, public
involvement becomes important. Roy Bahl (2008)
gives operational definition of fiscal decentralization as
the empowerment of people through the empowerment
of their local governments. The key term here is ‘the
local government’. Fiscal decentralization is about
central governments’ passing budgetary authority to
elected sub-national governments in the form of power
to make taxing and spending decisions.
For local government possessing natural resources,
fiscal decentralization can be a determining factor to
get higher incomes, to provide better services to the
community. One of the forms of fiscal decentralization
is Revenue Sharing Fund sourced from the wealth of
natural resources, in particular oil and gas. In order to
create local legislation, arranged according to people’s
needs, the allocation principals of Revenue Sharing
Fund for Oil and Gas should be as follows: 1) Fair:
producing regions which so far has the least benefit
from their own natural resources, should derive a
bigger portion in order to achieve a positive correlation
of the natural resources existence to the community
welfare. The level of revenue distribution starts
from the province to the indigenous communities; 2)
Proportional: concerns with funds distribution between
the producing areas and the non producing areas; 3)
Transparent: distribution and allocation process can
be assessed by public sectors; 4) Efficient: Revenue
Sharing Fund allocation process for producing areas
and/or non producing areas can be executed directly
based on the program and activity which has been
arranged and agreed by the local governments.
These four principals are the forms of the rightsbased Revenue Sharing Fund distribution, especially
for the producing areas from the levels of province
to the indigenous community. A positive impact from
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the implementation of the right-based approach is the
reduction in indigenous community’s distrust against
the government. A conflict of interest may occur among
governmental level. In the indigenous community
whose system is build on the customary law, a natural
resource management cannot be separated from their
existence. Having their position not incorporated in
the system can cause distrust between the government
and the indigenous community, which can eventually
influence the security of oil and gas exploration in
the field. Therefore, efforts to implement a suitable
Revenue Sharing Fund should not stop in the district
government level. District governments should also
ascertain that the Revenue Sharing Fund formula is
distributed down to the sub-district level and indigenous
community. The right formula paying attention to
the accountability principle is expected to reduce the
tension either among governmental level or between
the government and the indigenous community.
Recognition of local community’s right is not only
accomplished through the regulation issued by the
central government in the form of Revenue Sharing
Fund, but can also be a business relationship between
the local community and the company. Within this
kind of relationship, the community can get direct
benefit from the land used by the company for business
operation, through either renting method or share
ownership. The government plays a role as a facilitator
and as the protector on this business relationship.
RESEARCH METHOD
This article is based on the results of a research
conducted by the author in the Center for Population
and Policy Studies (CPPS) UGM during two periods
2012 and 2013-2014. Both research used qualitative
methods that entailed comparison studies between
practices in the regions in Indonesia and those in other
countries. The study in 2012 compared the oil and
gas Revenue Sharing Fund practices in West Papua
Province and Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD)
Province. Meanwhile, the 2014 study was conducted
in Fakfak district since it has been designated as an
area for future natural gas exploitation within the
framework of LNG expansion project located in
West Papua. The primary data for both research
were obtained by conducting in-depth interviews and
FGD with local leaders and members of the local
communities in oil and gas sector (NAD and West
Papua), while the secondary data were taken from
desk-study on legal documents, i.e. regulations on oil
and natural gas Revenue Sharing Fund in Indonesia.
To strengthen the analysis, comparison with practices/
experiences of oil and gas revenue sharing management
in other countries is made. Based on the outcome
of the comparison between Aceh, Papua and other
selected countries, coupled with results of interviews
and FGD with members of the local communities in
oil and gas producing areas, the author subsequently
formulates the oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund
model appropriate for the producing areas. The study
uses RBA, stressing on the importance of taking the
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rights of local native and indigenous communities into
consideration for revenue sharing. Previous studies
tend to use purely economic approach, making the
analysis very technocratic. This paper seeks to develop
bottom-up approaches to political rights of citizens
through RBA, to determine what should be a fair share
of the natural resources in the village. The bottomup approach is coupled with laws regarding Revenue
Sharing Funds (top-down) resulting in a more fair and
accountable draft of DBH policy.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The format used in allocating oil and gas Revenue
Sharing Fund at the national level is based on Law
No. 33/2004 which stipulates that the remainder of
revenue from a deduction of tax and other charges
from the revenue obtained from the exploitation and
production of oil and gas is shared under the following
arrangement/formula: Close to 69.5 percent goes to
the central government, and 30.5 percent is allocated
to local governments. The 30.5 percent component
is subsequently distributed based on the following
formula: 6 percent is allocated to the province, 12
percent to the district producing oil and gas, and 12
percent is distributed to other district governments
in the province within whose jurisdiction oil and gas
production occurs. The remainder that is 0.5 percent is
allocated to education and health expenditure.
However, specifically for Aceh and Papua, the
formula used in allocating oil and gas Revenue
Sharing Fund does not refers to the Law, as the two
provinces have a Special Regional Autonomy status
(asymmetric decentralization), hence enjoying special
arrangement. With regards to Papua, Law No. 21/2001
on special autonomy stipulates that the oil and gas
Revenue Sharing Fund is 70 percent and 30 percent
for the local government and central government,
respectively. Local community leaders in one of the
oil and gas producing districts in West Papua said that
there was no objection to the format that allocates 30
percent of oil and gas production revenue to the central
government. In accordance with article (34), subsection
(3), number (7), of the special regional administration,
a detailed arrangement is required with respect
to the 70 percent of oil and gas Revenue Sharing
Fund allocated to the local government, stating that
“the detailed allocation of revenues between Papua
province and district governments or any other names
is stipulated in detail and equitable manner in special
regulation which should pay special attention to under
developed areas”. Nonetheless, by the time this paper
was written, deliberations of the special regulation on
the oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund for West Papua
were still continuing.
With regards to Aceh, the formula used in allocating
oil and gas revenues is based on Special Regional
Autonomy Law No.11/2006, specifically article 181,
section 3. The law contains provisions that Aceh
province receives 55 percent of oil revenues, while the
central government gets 45 percent. Meanwhile, with
respect to natural gas, Aceh receives 40 percent of
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revenues, while 60 percent goes to central government
coffers. To that end, the formula allocates a smaller
proportion of oil and natural gas revenues to Aceh than
what Papua gets. Subsequently, article 182, section 3,
stipulates that at least 30 percent of revenues in the
oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund is allocated on
education expenditure. Article 182, section 4, explains
that at least 70 percent of oil and gas production sharing
revenue is allocated on development programs that are
jointly agreed upon by the provincial government and
district governments. In the shari’a regulation (Qanun)
No. 2/2008 on procedures of allocation of additional oil
and gas revenues and utilization of special autonomy
fund, it is stated that the allocation of 70 percent of the
oil and gas production revenue is based on an agreement
that is reached between Aceh provincial government
and district governments. The detailed account of the
utilization of the fund is as follows: First, 25 percent
of that allocation goes to district governments that
produce oil and gas resources. Secondly, 35 percent
is allocated to district/municipal governments that are
non-producers of oil and gas in Aceh province (with
the detail being that 50 percent is allocated equally and
the remaining 50 percent is allocated on the basis of
several indicators that include total population, area,
gross regional domestic product, human development
index, and other relevant indicators). Third, 40 percent
is allocated to development programs and activities
that are undertaken by Aceh government.
In accordance with the general formula stipulated
in Law No. 33/2004, many oil and gas producing local
governments in Indonesia consider it unjust. The same
applies to the formula that is encapsulated in West
Papua gubernatorial regulation and the Law on Special
regional autonomy for Aceh, which many perceive as
yet to incorporate aspirations of oil and gas producing
district governments. Similar disappointment is
palpable in many oil and gas producing district
governments in Aceh, which consider the provisions
embodied in the special regional autonomy have yet
to evince tangible outcomes for producers of oil and
gas in the province. The dissatisfaction that local
government feel about the formula currently used
for allocating oil and gas revenues was articulated
by a local religious leader residing in the oil and gas
producing area in West Papua. According to him, oil
and gas producing districts should have control over
the way oil and gas is allocated. The structure of
bureaucracy at district level falls under the jurisdiction
of the province; however, the ups and downs related
to oil and gas production occur at the district level. In
light of that, oil and gas producing districts must have
control over the distribution and allocation of oil and
gas revenues. To that end, there is a need for an urgent
resolution of the problem if dissatisfaction does not
only translate into a vertical conflict among districts
at the same level of administration, but also between
local governments at different levels. Moreover, the
above situation remains unresolved even after the
provincial government has been vested with authority
and power to regulate the issue. This is by and large
due to the failure of the provincial government to take
on such responsibility.
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Moreover, oil and gas producing district
governments face incessant pressure from local
indigenous communities who consider the oil and gas
exploited land as theirs by ancestry. In fact, as has
been elucidated earlier, many rebellions in Indonesia
involved grass root communities who felt neglected
despite the fact that they are ancestral owners of the
land on which economic activities occur. The majority
of communities in oil and gas producing areas
continue to enjoy a standard of living, far below that
enjoyed by other areas in Indonesia. Thus, the low
social welfare, which members of communities enjoy
in oil and gas producing areas, is very much in contrast
to the vast natural resources potential such areas have.
This therefore means that the vast natural resource
potential does not correlate positively with the level
of social welfare of the population that inhabits the
oil and gas producing areas. To that end, to avert the
danger of falling into the natural resource curse, the
need for developing a formula that will ensure a just
allocation and management of oil and gas revenues
is deemed necessary and urgent. Developing such a
formula will dissipate fears and sense of neglect that
many communities in oil and gas producing areas feel,
thereby reducing the potential for future conflicts. As
a comparison, the paper studied the practices used
in the determination and management of oil and gas
revenues in Bolivia and Ghana.
Bolivia is one of the countries whose national
revenue depends heavily on oil and gas production.
Government revenues from oil and gas take the form
of royalty on oil and gas exploration and direct hydrocarbon tax. Bolivian royalty system sets a proportion
of 18 percent and has been in place since 2005.
Meanwhile, hydro-carbon tax rate varies from 18% to
32 % of the value of oil and gas extraction which is
backed by a political agreement.
In addition, Bolivia obliges the possession of an
extraction license for all oil and gas exploration and
exploitation companies. Later on 50 percent of the
revenue from the tax is used in natural preservation
and is allocated to oil and gas producing regions.
Subsequently, the remaining 50% is allocated to
the Ministry of Environment. Some of the 32% is
allocated for expenditure that supports organizational
development (Morgandi, 2008).
Bolivia is one of the countries that allocate a
very small percentage of oil and gas production for
the central government (37%), with the remainder
allocated to pension fund development, Universities,
and company development. Nonetheless, criticism
is leveled against the high direct hydro-carbon tax,
the process of determining has more often than not
degenerates into political bickering and a source of
instability (Morgandi, 2008).
Meanwhile, Mining is Ghana’s main source of
revenue, contributing 12% to national revenue. In
general, revenue from mining activities is drawn from
royalty payments that average 3-6% and corporate
income tax. Revenue from the two sources is then
disbursed to local governments through District
Assemblies Common Fund, which according to
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prevailing laws is set at least 7.5%. However, 100
percent of the fund coming from tax belongs to the
central government, while 80 % of revenues from
royalty goes to the central government. Meanwhile,
10 % of the remaining royalty revenue is allocated
to mineral development fund and community land
owners (Morgandi, 2008).
Based on the above scheme, the inference that can
be drawn is that the central government receives the
largest portion of oil and gas production. Meanwhile,
oil and gas producing areas have to do with very
little. Criticism leveled against the scheme relates to
the delay that often characterizes the fund transferred
to beneficiaries. Besides, another criticism is the
slow absorption of the fund transferred to local
governments. Consequently, the transfer of fund to
local governments is considered inefficient and has
been decried for delays that often bedevil program
implementation.
In general, a nation often uses certain terminologies
in effecting the distribution of revenues to local
governments. Oil and gas revenues are categorized into
two forms, namely: vertical distribution and horizontal
distribution. Vertical distribution refers to revenues
from the mining sector from one area or region within
the country, the distribution of which is based on the
level of government. The level of distribution is in turn
categorized into three levels: central, provincial, and
district governments. To that end, vertical distribution
entails the distribution of vertical revenue for the
provincial government and the central government.
Besides, in the event that oil and gas revenues are still
available, it is allocated to district governments as oil
and gas producers. Meanwhile, horizontal distribution
is the sharing of oil and gas revenue to three tiers of
government that include the central, provincial, and
district governments regardless whether or not the
beneficiaries are oil and gas producers. To have an
in-depth understanding of the various conditions that
characterize Revenue Sharing Fund arrangements,
the following section gives an elucidation of the
mechanisms used in allocating oil and gas revenues.
The mechanism used in allocating oil and gas
revenues sharing fund is categorized into three forms.
Fist, allocation of revenue based on whether or not
the area is a producer or not (derivation). Secondly,
revenue allocation mechanism based on a certain
formula underpinned by various variables that serve
as factors of consideration for a certain area such
as (population, per capita income, or efforts toward
promoting improvement in incomes). In other words,
revenue allocation mechanism is based on certain
requirements or conditions or formula (statutory
formula). Lastly, the level of oil and gas revenue
generated by oil and gas exploration and production is
not set or determined. Nonetheless, the level of revenue
distributed through production sharing to provinces
and districts is incorporated in the general transfer of
revenue to local governments without specifying the
percentage that production sharing contributes to the
general transfer fund (undifferentiated). The three
concepts above (derivation, statutory formula, and
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undifferentiated) determine the level of allocation of oil
and gas Revenue Sharing Fund that are used in many
countries, including Indonesia (Morgandi, 2008).
It is regrettable that Indonesia has yet to take into
consideration the rights of local communities in the
allocation of oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund.
According to Boesen and Martin (2007) the definition
underpinned by the Rights Based Approach (RBA)
is a framework that integrates international norms,
principles, standards, and goals of a human rights system
into development plans and process. The framework is
characterized by methods and activities associated with
the human rights system and have strong influence on
the functioning and organizational development of the
system itself. We have the conviction that RBA has the
ability to take incorporate poverty as manifestation
of injustice, marginalization, discrimination, and
exploitation as the principal causes of impoverishment.
Based on this approach, poverty ceases to be considered
a mistake by an individual which entails resolving the
use of a personal approach. In general RBA analysis
uses technical analysis of the relationship between
rights-holders and duty-bearers. Rights-holders are
those who have the rights that must be observed, while
duty-bearers are those who have the authority, hence are
expected to observe rights of rights-holders. The main
dynamic of RBA lies in identifying the fundamental
cause of poverty, empowering rights-holders to clamor,
and lay claim to observance of their rights as well as
strengthen the competence of duty-bearers to conduct
their functions in more responsible manner (Boesen
and Martin, 2007).
The following section elucidates the use of technical
analysis of the relationship between duty-bearers and
rights-holders in the context of relations between
the central government and local governments in
the distribution of oil and gas revenues. The central
government is a duty bearer with respect to oil and gas
provincial governments, which is why the latter have
the right to demand fair treatment from the former.
On the contrary, it is the responsibility of the central
government to conduct the distribution of oil and gas
revenues in a fair, transparent, and accountable manner.
The following is the relation between the provincial and
district government. Provincial governments are dutybearers while district governments are rights-holders.
What is true with respect to the relations between
the central government and provincial governments
is also true for the relations between the oil and gas
producing provincial and district governments. At
the level of district governments, the same pattern of
relationship should continue to lower tiers as this level
of government is duty-bearer with respect to sub district
administrations, which therefore are rights-holders.
However, the foregoing is only possible if and only if sub
district governments are autonomous, and not merely
parts of district governments. In the same vein, the sub
district assumes the role of duty-bearers for villages/
urban hamlets which are therefore rights-holders. The
delineation does not end there, as some areas with
strong native communities, oil and gas revenue sharing
formula is incomplete if they are excluded.
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To that end, the main problem that bedevils the
current formula used in distributing oil and gas
revenues is the exclusion of local communities as the
rightful right holders. This is despite the reality that
local communities are in essence the principals who
own natural wealth underground. Ancestors of such
communities used to traverse day in day out land that
is today the center of exploration and exploitation by
multinational companies through concessions they
obtain from the central government. Members of
society consider the funds they receive both in cash
and kind as well as development programs as theirs
by right. There is a clear link between right and time
when disbursement is made. Members of society
consider the transfer of money delayed as a debt:
“debt” payments of which, members of society have
the inalienable right to demand by knocking on the
door or dowry that oil and gas company promises to
deliver to DAV region.
The 1945 constitution, article 33, section (3) states
that “Land, water and all natural wealth contained
therein is under the control of the state and must be
used to as much as possible enhance people’s welfare”.
The interpretation of ‘under the control of the state’
should neither be seen as inputting the monopoly of the
government nor non-inclusion of members of society as
ultimate principal owners. In other words, the article
should be interpreted as evincing full responsibility of
the state to fulfill its obligations in as fair a manner as
possible to members of society who are the principal
owners of land that is used for oil and gas operations
while at the same time, taking into considerations rights
of communities and people in areas that are not directly
impacted by such operations. Such distributive fairness
should be proportion in the way sharing is made for
communities that are directly impacted by oil and gas
operations and those that are not.
Unfortunately, Indonesia does not yet consider indigenous
communities such as communal landowners as rightholders. According to Morgandi (2008) a number of
countries that are producers of oil and gas include
indigenous communities in the calculation of oil and gas
production sharing arrangement. In addition to Bolivia
(land for indigenous people and compesinos communities
out of treasury share of revenues), and Ghana (stoolscustomary land titles holders), other countries are Brazil
(landowners-royalty rate of value), and PNG (private and
communal landowners).
Considering developments in local political dynamics
today, Indonesia should include grass roots rights-holders
both institutions and indigenous communities in the
determination of oil and gas production sharing formula.
In fact, the special regional autonomy laws No.21/2001
and Law No.11/2006 for Papua and Aceh respectively in
part constitute an adoption of RBA theory; for example,
special regional autonomy for Papua stipulates that
“efforts to devolve wide ranging authority to the local
government and local people to manage and regulate
their own affairs, in the conduct of government functions,
and regulate the use of natural resources there lie under
their jurisdiction, as well as authority to empower social,
economic, and cultural potential, and conferring sufficient
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role upon Papua indigenous people”. The regulation of the
above issue is evident in the explanation text to the Law
No.21/2001 on special autonomy. Thus, special autonomy
status reiterates recognition of the rights of local
communities over their existence as an ethnic minority
and as such deserving special treatment. To that end, the
conclusion can be drawn that special regional autonomy
law mandates the application of RBA principles in fiscal
decentralization in general and management of oil and
gas Revenue Sharing Fund in particular.
According to the World Bank (1997), the potential
benefit likely to arise from devolution of the conduct
of fiscal administration to lower tier polities is the
increase in efficiency in the implementation of public
service delivery as well as the reducing information
and transaction costs associated with the provision of
public goods and services. Moreover, decentralization
of fiscal authority to local governments fosters easier
public participation in the development process. In
other words, fiscal decentralization has positive
correlation with RBA principles which in essence
stress the importance of public participation in
determining issues affecting their lives. The principle
emphasizes the notion that participation is a public
right for rights-holders, mandated by duty bearers to
observe the process of managing the authority related
to oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund at the government
level. Besides, based on the principle of subsidiary of
public finance, the performance of public sector can
be enhanced by including local aspects such as local
culture, environment, natural resource endowment,
and social and economic institutions. The principle
is truly relevant to RBA principle that considers
social and economic diversity of the local people and
is attendant to various interests and needs. To that
end, duty bearers should appreciate local diversity
and potential in accordance with the international
recognized human rights. The expectation is that
by including local elements and characteristics, the
management of oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund will
reflect government’s pertinent response to the needs
and problems of indigenous people.
To achieve the desired goals, the process of
allocating oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund should
be based on appropriate and right principles. To make
such regulations binding, such principles should be
incorporated in a local government regulation, which
both rights holders and duty bearers should formulate.
As an example, the Aceh Qanun No. 2/2008 on the
procedures of allocating additional funds for oil and
gas revenues and use of special regional authority does
not include principles that underpin the allocation,
use, and accountability of oil and gas revenue fund.
To a large extent, the Qanun regulates issues that are
centralistic at the provincial government level. This is
understandable given the fact that all issues concerning
the administration of activities and functions financed
by funds deriving from oil and gas Revenue Sharing
Fund fall under the purview of the provincial
government. Meanwhile, district governments serve
as locus rather than focus of the decision making
process in the interest of the population under their

Volume 23, Number 1

jurisdiction. Doubtless, such regulation will make the
realization of regional autonomy far removed from the
interests and aspirations of indigenous people.
Some principles, which must be observed in
allocating oil and gas revenues, thereby averting the
problem of domination by the government (dutybearers), are as follows: First is fairness, meaning
that oil and gas producing regions who to this day
have never been shared oil and gas revenues should
receive a larger share, having positive correlation
with the welfare of indigenous people. The concept
of producing regions, which is in congruence with the
concept of fiscal decentralization, is tiered relations.
Besides the province, other administrative tiers below
it include district, sub districts, village governments
located in oil and gas producing region. There is a
need to emphasize the fact that in accordance with
RBA principle, the concept of oil and gas producing
region, should include indigenous communities who
have ancestral ownership over the land within the
institutional structure of land ownership. Thus, by
taking into consideration the institutional structure
of land ownership, the management of oil and
gas Revenue Sharing Fund will foster fairness
for indigenous communities. Based on outcomes
of several FGD with local traditional leaders and
members of indigenous communities, it is only by
the involvement of indigenous communities living in
areas of exploration and exploitation centers will the
distribution process of oil and gas Revenue Sharing
Fund achieve fairness. Some opinion of local leaders
and members of society who inhabit one of the oil and
gas producing districts concerning what constitutes
fair percentage in the sharing of oil and gas revenues
are depicted in Table 1.
Secondly is proportional. Based on this principle,
Indonesia as an independent nation adheres to,
espouses, and is committed to promoting the notion of
a unitary state of the republic of Indonesia. Based on
this concept, other oil and gas non-producing regions
have the right to have a fair share in mineral production
revenue generated by exploration and exploitation
activities undertaken in producing areas within a
proportional distribution framework. To that end, any
measure put in place to distribute revenues from oil
and gas must be based on a proportional framework.
Apparently, members of indigenous communities
acknowledge the concept of proportionality with
respect to the distribution of oil and gas Revenue
Sharing Fund in West Papua province. Based on
results of interviews conducted with members of the
indigenous communities there is a need to distribute
oil and gas revenue not only to other Papuans but also
in-migrants and other Indonesians.
Thirdly is transparent. Based on this principle, the
process of distribution and allocation of oil and gas
Revenue Sharing Fund should be open or transparent,
hence disseminated to the public. This means that the
formula used in the distribution of oil and gas Revenue
Sharing Fund must be transparent and sourced from
the capacity, volume of oil and gas extracted (lifting),
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Table 1. Opinions of respondents in an oil and gas producing district in West Papua concerning the
distribution of oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund to various beneficiaries in the province
No.

Category of
respondents

Opinion

1

Traditional/
customary leader

Out of 70 percent allocated to the province, 20 percent should be allocated to the province,
and 50 percent disbursed to district governments. Subsequently, 30 percent of the 50 percent
should go to district governments and 20 percent allocated to non-oil and gas producing
district governments

2

Religious leaders

Out of 70 percent of oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund received by the province, 20 percent
should be allocated to the province and 50 percent to district governments. Alternatively, 30
percent should be allocated to the province, and 40 percent to oil and gas producing districts.
Religious leaders contend that of the 70 percent of the oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund
disbursed to the province, 40 percent should be allocated to oil and gas producing district
governments, and 5 percent should go to indigenous leaders. The remainder 25 percent
should be allocated to the province.

3

Local People

Indigenous communities demand a share between 5 percent and 12 percent

Source: Report on Oil and Gas Revenue Sharing Fund in West Papua, CPPS-UGM, 2012

and price of oil and gas in the international market.
These factors have for long been shrouded in secrecy
in the oil and gas industry in Indonesia, ranging
from uncertainty about the actual capacity Indonesia
has today, how long will it last in future before it is
exhausted, to the volume of lifting that goes to oil and
gas companies, as well as the real prices of oil and gas
on the international market. As a result of the cloak
of uncertainty that continues to surround the above
issues, many areas rarely know how much oil and gas
Revenue Sharing Fund they are supposed to received,
by virtue of their rights, as opposed to what they actually
get, based on central government decisions. Not few
local governments continue to face high uncertainty in
determining the oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund they
receive which in turn has adverse effect on their annual
budgeting plans. Meanwhile, with regards to the public
perception about the existence of oil and gas Revenue
Sharing Fund, many expressed ignorance, doubt, as
well as inability to differentiate the fund from the
compensation fund regulated in the LNG environmental
impact assessment way back in 2002. To many, oil and
gas Revenue Sharing Fund remains an issue, a promise,
and a plan, which has never been bore fruition. In other
words the absence of knowledge among members of the
public about oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund attests
to the secrecy with which the fund continues to be
determined and administered.
Fourthly is accountable. Based on the prevailing
regulatory framework, an accountability for the use to
which oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund is put, must be
made. Besides, accountability can also be gauged from the
capacity of oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund to contribute
to overcoming problems as well as meet the needs of
local governments and their citizenry. Competence and
integrity of duty bearers and responsiveness of rights
holders is an absolute requirement for achieving that.
Professional management of oil and gas Revenue Sharing
Fund, right from the level of province to indigenous
communities, is an absolute necessity if inefficiency in
management and moral hazard so far plaguing the fund
can be avoided.

Fifth, is participative. Funding for development
programs and activities deriving from oil and gas
Revenue Sharing Fund must be in accordance with the
needs of society. In other words, the key word is the
democratization of oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund
management. The state must avail rights holders the
opportunity to participate directly in the management
of oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund by proving them
ample room for forums in which they are involved to play
a role in oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund management.
To that end, the existence of an oil and gas Revenue
Sharing Fund agreed jointly by both rights holders and
duty bearers is long overdue. The absence of an oil and
gas Revenue Sharing Fund system that is clear, well
streamlined, acceptable to the public if not resolved has
the potential to ferment conflicts over claims that may
degenerate into abuse of power and authority.
Sixth is efficient and effective. Despite the fact
that the process of oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund
distribution is a protracted one that consumes a lot
of energy and time, it does not mean that it should
abnegate from efficiency. The only way to achieve that
is through the allocation of oil and gas Revenue Sharing
Fund to oil and gas producing and non-producing
local governments directly based on programs and
activities encapsulated in plans that are products of
consensus between local governments and the general
public. Besides, the main goal of managing oil and gas
Revenue Sharing Fund is to maximize social welfare
as enjoined in 1945 Indonesian constitution (article 33,
section 3). To that end, whatever model is adopted in
managing oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund must be
tailored toward achieving this overarching goal.
An observation of various viewpoints encapsulated
in the Law on the financial balancing between the central
and local governments, special regional autonomy,
concept of fiscal decentralization underpinned by
RBA, are imperative in the formulation of an oil
and gas Revenue Sharing Fund formula especially
those applied to the district level and lower tiers of
government. This model does not distinguish between
oil and gas because both are natural resources, the
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distribution of revenue from production operations
that must take into consideration local governments
and indigenous communities. The main problem lies
in abnegation and not taking into consideration local
governments and communities even though the land
on which oil and gas operations occur belong to them.
In light of that, the model recommends two scenarios
which if implemented can help to resolve the problem.
The first scenario is putting indigenous communities
into the position of active players in oil and gas
industry. The concept of “active player” here refers
to the recognition of the existence of indigenous
communities as holding rights and having the capacity
to participate in oil and gas business. Recognition of
the existence of the communities as rights holders in oil
and gas business is in line with principles of legality as
oil and gas operations are located in customary lands
that have for centuries been sources of livelihood for
such communities. To that end, once the government
recognizes active participation in oil and gas business,
there will no longer be a need for the government as
duty bearers to distribute oil and gas revenues to them
simply because with respect to oil and gas business their
rights will have been met. Henceforth, their share in oil
and gas revenues will depend on market mechanisms.
Based on the scenario of recognition of customary/
traditional communities as active players in oil and
gas industry, two models are proposed. First model
is indigenous communities becoming shareholders in
oil and gas business. This model positions indigenous
communities as subjects (rights-holders) in the business
because they have right of ownership over the land used
by the oil and gas industry to run its operations. The
value of shares that is eventually given to indigenous
communities very much depends on capital market
developments. To manage the shares, indigenous
communities can form a customary institution or
a company managed by capable and competent
individuals drawn from local community. The state
as duty-bearers has the obligation to facilitate the
process by providing supervision to the institution or
company. The use to which revenues that are generated
by the company will be put liable to discussion with all
members of society within the framework of enhancing
social welfare of all elements of society. Second
models, Indigenous community lease the land to oil
and gas industry. This model has some similarity with
the first model, but with a difference. The difference
lies in the fact that indigenous communities do not
become shareholders in the oil and gas industry, but
serve as rights holders leasing their land to the industry.
The model has been adopted in many other countries
such as PNG and Brazil. The amount of revenue
indigenous communities generate by leasing their land
depends on prevailing market prices of land in the area
where oil and gas operations are located. Meanwhile,
the revenues generated from leasing the land to oil
and gas industry is by and large tailored to enhance
collective welfare of all members of society. The role
of the government as duty-bearers in this exercise is to
facilitate and supervise the use of revenue.
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The second scenario entails the formulation of a
Revenue Sharing Fund that is fair from perspective
of the government to indigenous communities. If the
government fails to implement the first scenario, the
onus of the government is to formulate a fair, just,
and proportional formula for distributing oil and gas
Revenue Sharing Fund that takes into consideration
indigenous communities. In accordance with the
special autonomy for West Papua, local government
receives a share of 70% while the central government
gets 30%. The choice of 30:70 percent sharing ratio
in this model is based on the fact that the above ratio
has been adopted and applied in the legal framework
and has been acceptable and considered equitable by
most elements of society. Subsequently, there is need
to develop a formula for sharing the 70 % of oil and
gas revenue disbursed to lower tiers of government,
including indigenous communities. The pattern
reflects the relationship between rights holders and
duty bearers. In other words, the pattern follows RBA
principle that emphasizes the need for the smallest
community which in principle is the ultimate owners
of oil and gas wealth to be included in any formula
that distributes oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund in
area where they are located. The formula proposed is
elicited as follows: 1) Out of the 70% of oil and gas
revenue that is allocated to local government, 10 %
should be kept in a reserve fund that takes the form of
an endowment fund. The fund should be allocated to
human resources development programs and activities,
and health as well as education. The management of
the fund should be entrusted with the province and
must comply with and adhere to transparency and
accountability principles. That leaves a difference
of 90% (100%-10%) from 70 percent of the revenue
disbursed to the local government; 2) Subsequently,
the remaining 90% should be distributed in accordance
with government hierarchy, and the distribution made
to oil and gas producers at every level. To simplify
the hierarchy, the administrative structure is divided
into district governments, which includes district
government, village administration, and indigenous
communities. In accordance with Law No. 33/2004,
the pattern used is 6:12:12 or 20:40:40. Based on
the pattern, then a) the province receives 20% with
the condition that the provincial government must put
priority expenditure on education, health, and interregional infrastructure; b) District governments located
in oil and gas producing provinces receive 40%. The
district governments, in turn, are supposed to disburse oil
and gas Revenue Sharing Fund to administrative levels
below them with indigenous communities receiving
oil and gas revenues based on a 20:40:40 pattern. To
that end, out of 40% that district governments receive,
district governments get 20%, village that are producers
of oil and gas get 40% and villages that are not producers
of oil and gas receive 40%. Subsequently, oil and gas
producing villages in the district governments, use the
same pattern to distribute oil and gas Revenue Sharing
Fund they receive to oil and gas producing and nonproducing indigenous communities. Thus, out of 40 %
of oil and gas revenue that oil and gas producing and
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non-producing villages receive, villages get 20%, while
oil and gas producing indigenous communities receive
40%, while non-producing indigenous communities
also get 40%. What is slightly difference is the formula
used to distribute oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund
to oil and gas non-producing villages located in oil
and gas producing district governments. The formula
proposed is 50:50. This implies that out of 40% of oil
and gas revenues the oil and gas non-producing villages
receive, 50% is allocated to villages and 50% goes to
indigenous communities; c) oil and gas non-producing
district governments located in oil and gas producing
provinces receive 40%. The pattern of 20:40:40 is used
to allocate oil and gas revenue to villages and indigenous
communities. To that end, out of 40% of revenue that
the oil and gas non-producing district governments
receive, 20% is disbursed to district governments, 40%
goes to villages, and 40% to indigenous communities.
Second Scenario above is depicted in Figure 1.
The distribution pattern based on the two scenarios
is extremely different from the pattern applied in
Aceh and those based on West Papua gubernatorial
regulation No. 542/11/V/2001. In accordance with
Aceh special regional autonomy, 60% of oil and gas
Revenue Sharing Fund is allocated to the central
government and 40% goes to local governments. Local
government here refers absolutely to the provincial
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autonomy vested with the obligation to disburse oil
and gas Revenue Sharing Fund it receives to local
governments that lie under its jurisdiction. Out of
40% of oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund allocated
to local governments, 30% is specifically allocated
to expenditure on education and 70 % for local
development (the province receives 40%, oil and
gas producing districts get 25%, and non-producing
districts receive 35%). The pattern arrangement, used
in Aceh does not have an endowment fund.
Another difference between the oil and gas
distribution pattern used in Aceh and that adopted
in West Papua (see Table 2), lies in the fact that in
accordance with West Papua gubernatorial regulation,
45% of petroleum and 60% of natural gas is allocated
to the central government. Subsequently, 55 % of oil
and gas Revenue Sharing Fund allocated to the local
government is distributed based on the following
pattern: 16.50% goes to the province, 19.25% is
allocated to oil and gas producing districts, while
19.25% is allocated to activities engendering equity
purposes. Meanwhile, natural gas revenue allocated
to the local government 40% is redistributed in the
pattern that allocates 12% to provincial governments,
14% to natural gas producing districts, and 14% to
equity purposes. This Revenue Sharing Fund pattern
does not have an endowment fund, as well.

Figure 1. Oil and Gas Revenue Sharing Fund Scenario
Source: primary data, CPPS-UGM, 2012
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Table 2. Differences in the oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund formula between models and alternatives
Aceh

West Papua Gubernatorial regulation

Alternative Models

60 percent is allocated to the central
government

45 percent of petroleum oil and
60percent of natural gas is allocated to
the central government

30 percent is allocated to the central
government

40 percent is allocated to the local
government. The portion allocated to
the local government is subsequently
redistributed using the following
arrangement:
1) 30 percent is allocated to
education (Law No.11 / 2006 and
Qanun No.2/ 2008)
2) 70 percent is allocated to
development programs
a) 25 percent for producers
b) 35 percent for nonproducers:50 percent is
distributed equally and
50 percent is distributed in
accordance with selected
indicators
c) 40 percent is allocated to the
province

In West Papua gubernatorial regulation
No.542/11/V/2011, the allocation of
natural gas and petroleum is done
separately:

70 percent is located to local
government

Note:
This arrangement does not have an
endowment fund

b) Natural Gas : 40 percent
1. Province gets 12 percent
2. Producers receive 14 percent:
• 70 percent is distributed equally
• 30 percent is distributed based on
area weight (area is given weight
of 20 percent; community is given
weight of 15 percent; IKK 20 percent;
indigenous people is accorded weight
of 45 percent)
3.Equity purposes are allocated 14
percent

a) Petroleum: 55 percent
1. Province receives 16.50 percent
2.Producers get 19.25 percent:
• 30 percent is distributed to
producers
• 70 percent is distributed in
accordance with certain weights
(area is given weight of 20 percent;
population is given weight of 15
percent; IKK 20 percent; indigenous
people is accorded weight of 45
percent)
3.Equity purposes allocated 19.25
percent

Note:
This arrangement does not have an
endowment fund

a) 10 percent goes to the endowment
fund
b) The remaining 90 percent is
distributed based on the formula 6:12:12
= 20:40:40
• Province is allocated 20 percent
• Districts that are producers receive:
40 percent, which is redistributed to
the district itself (20%), producing
villages ( 40%), non-producing
villages 40%. At the producing
village level, 20% is allocated to the
village itself, 40% goes to indigenous
communities and 40% is allocated to
non-producing villages. With respect
to non-producing villages, 50 % is
allocated to village administrations,
and 50% goes to indigenous
communities.
• As regards to non-producing
districts: they receive 40 percent,
which is redistributed in such a way
that 20% is allocated to the district,
40% is disbursed to villages, and
40% goes to indigenous communities
Note:
Takes into consideration the endowment
fund which is specifically tailored
toward human resource development
(education and health) of the local
communities
.

Source: Research Report on Community Economic Development in Fakfak district, West Papua. Collaboration of CPPS GMU and
Fakfak district government, 2014 and Report on Oil and Gas Revenue Sharing Fund in West Papua province, CPPS GMU, 2012.

CONCLUSION
One of the root causes of uncertainty that more
often than not plagues oil and gas producing regions
and communities is the failure of existing formula
used in distributing oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund
to take into account fairness for producing areas and
communities. To that end, there is need to redress this
problem. This paper urges the need to adopt rights
based approach in the decentralization of public
finance management, especially in the formulation of
fiscal balancing between local governments and the
central government. This approach is proposed within
the framework of fostering integration of norms,
principles, standards, systems, and goals derived from
an internationally recognized human rights system into
development planning and process.
The RBA analysis conducted uses technical
analysis of the relationship between rights-holders

and duty-bearers. Rights-holders are holders of rights,
while duty-bearers are parties vested with authority and
power, whose use is supposed to take into consideration
the rights of rights-holders. In RBA parlance, the root
cause of the problem in the distribution of oil and
gas Revenue Sharing Fund lies in the exclusion of or
noninvolvement of indigenous communities, despite
the fact that they are the ultimate rights holders of the
land used for oil and gas operations. They are in other
words, the principal of all natural wealth underground
those lands.
By the same token, based on the relationship between
rights-holders and duty-bearers, two proposals are
made, one that involves turning indigenous communities
shareholders into permanently active participants in oil
and gas business. This scenario offers two possibilities
for indigenous communities. One envisages indigenous
communities either as shareholders in oil and gas
business or engages in leasing the land used to support
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oil and gas operations. The value of shares as well
as the value of the lease indigenous communities get
largely depends on market forces. If the first scenario
is adopted, the government as duty-bearers is no longer
required to bear the responsibility of allocating oil and
gas Revenue Sharing Fund to indigenous communities
directly. Meanwhile, the second scenario envisages
the calculation of oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund
based on tiers of government that are both producers
and non-producers of oil and gas right from the
province, district, to indigenous communities. The
pattern of distributing oil and gas Revenue Sharing
Fund should be based on the formula that is already
accepted as legally binding, in accordance with Law
No. No.33/2004, which is 6:12:12 or in other words
composition of 20:40:40.
The formula is a moderate offer which the government
can take into consideration as a fair and proportional
oil and gas Revenue Sharing Fund. Nonetheless, there
is need to note that in final analysis, calculation of the
formula composition is more often than not influenced
by transactional considerations, not amenable to
interventions grounded in rationality approaches.
Should there be an issue at the front and center in
designing a fair and proportional oil and gas Revenue
Sharing Fund formula, the importance of including and
involving indigenous communities in the process must
be taken into consideration and recognized as they are
the principal owners of natural resources.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Author wish to thank the Local Government of
Fakfak Regency, Province of West Papua as well as
the Centre for Population Policy Studies (CPPS),
Universitas Gadjah Mada, especially Dr. Anna Maria
Wattie and Dr. Eny Nurbaningsih to provide data for
this paper.
REFERENCES
Ahmad, Ehtisham; Singh, Raju. (2003). Political Economy
of Oil-Revenue Sharing in a Developing Country:
Illustration from Nigeria. A working paper WP/03/16.
Washington: IMF
Amal, Ichlasul. 1992. Regional and Central Government in
Indonesian Politics: West Sumatra and South Sulawesi
1949-1979. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University
Press.
Arakan Oil Watch. (2012). Burma’s Resource Curse: The
Case for Revenue Transparency in the Oil and Gas
Sector. Burma
Bahl, Roy. (2008). The Pillars of Fiscal Decentralization.
CAF Working paper No. 2008/07.
Booth, Anne. 2014. “Before the ‘Big Bang’:
Decentralization Debates and Practice in Indonesia,
1949-99”. in Regional Dynamics in a Decentralized
Indonesia. Edited by Hal Hill. Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies.
Centre for Population and Policy Studies. (2012). Analysis

27

Report of Oil and Gas Revenue Sharing Fund in West
Papua. A research report. Yogyakarta: CPPS UGM.
Centre for Population and Policy Studies. (2014).
Community Economic Development in Fakfak District,
West Papua. 2013-2014 research report, a collaboration
of CPPS UGM with District Government of Fakfak.
Yogyakarta
Hammond, John L. (2011). “The Resource Curse and
Oil Revenues in Angola and Venezuela”. Science &
Society, Vol.75, No.3, July 2011: 347-378
Haris, Syamsuddin. (2005). Desentralisasi dan Otonomi
Daerah. Second Edition. Jakarta: LIPI Press.
Kurniawati. Tenti. (2012). “Konflik dalam Penentuan Dana
Bagi Hasil antara Pusat dengan Provinsi Kalimantan
Timur”. Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik. Volume
16, No. 1, Juli 2012. Yogyakarta: Fisipol UGM
Mas’oed, Mochtar. (2003). Negara, Kapital, dan
Demokrasi. First edition. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
Morgandi, Matteo. (2008). Extractive Industries Revenues
Distribution at the Sub-National Level: The Experience
in Seven Resource-Rich Countries. A working paper.
New York: Revenue Watch Institute.
Muhwezi, Wilson Winston; Bainomugisha, Arthur;
Ratemo, Fred; Wainnier, Greg. (2009). Crafting An
Oil Revenue-Sharing Mechanism for Uganda: A
Comparative Analysis. ACODE Policy Research Series
No.30, 2009. Kampala
Muramira, Telly Eugene; Manyindo, Jacob. (2008).
Sharing Oil and Gas Revenue in Uganda. Oil & Gas
Series #. Uganda Wildlife Society
Pratikno. (2005). “Pengelolaan Hubungan Pusat dan
Daerah”. in Desentralisasi dan Otonomi Daerah. Haris
Syamsuddin (ed). Second edition. Jakarta: LIPI Press.
Provincial Government of Nangroe Aceh Darussalam.
(2008). Qanun Aceh No. 1 of 2008 concerning Financial
Management of Aceh. Aceh.
--------------. (2008). Qanun Aceh No. 2 of 2008 concerning
the Procedure for Allocation of Additional Sharing
from Oil and Gas and the Use of Special Autonomy
Fund. Aceh
Rondinelli, Dennis A., John R. Nellis, and G. Shabir
Cheema. (1983). Decentralization in Developing
Countries: A Review of Recent Experience. Washington
DC: World Bank Staff Working Papers.
The Republic of Indonesia. (2001). Law No. 21 of 2001
concerning Special Autonomy for Papua Province.
Jakarta.
--------------. (2004). Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning
Local Government (Indonesian State Gazette of 2004
No. 125, Supplement to the Indonesian State Gazette
No. 4437). Jakarta.
--------------. (2004) Law No.33 of 2004 concerning
Financial Balance between Central and Local
Governments. Jakarta
--------------. (2006). Law No.11 of 2006 concerning
Government of Aceh. Jakarta
Wahyuningsih, Rutiana Dwi; Sri Hastjartjo. (2014).
“The Social Accountability Paradox in the Regional
Democratic Budget Policy Making”. Jurnal Bisnis dan
Birokrasi. Vol. 21, No.3 pp.149. Universitas Indonesia.

